when the United States was at the bottom of the deepest depression in its history before or since. The dominant problem of the time was economics.
How to get out of the depression? How to reduce unemployment? What explained the paradox of great need on the one hand and unused resources on the other? Under the circumstances, becoming an economist seemed more relevant to the burning issues of the day than becoming an applied mathematician or an actuary (1986, pp. 82-3) .
The connectedness of economic theory to practical problems was one of the features that set it apart from other intellectual disciplines. And it is on this point that in the late 1940s
Friedman believed that methodological Walrasians, were taking economics off track. His preference for the Marshallian approach to economics was that it preserved the ties between economic theory and practical problems. In a 1988 interview Friedman responded to a question about Jacob Viner's graduate price theory course, in which he was a student in 1932:
It had no explicit methodological content whatsoever. But there was a very strong implicit methodological content, since you came away very clearly with the feeling that you were talking about real problems. Part of the distinction is viewing economics as a branch of mathematics ---as a game -as an intellectual game and exercise -as Debreu, Arrow and so on -and it's a fine thing to do. There's nothing wrong with that. After all, mathematics is a perfectly respectable intellectual activity, and so is mathematization of economics or anything else. The other part of it is viewing it (using Marshall's phrase) as an engine of analysis. And there was no doubt that Viner viewed it as an engine of analysis, and no doubt when you were in his course that you came away with the feeling that economics really had something to say about real problems and real things.
In that sense it had methodological content (Hammond, 1992, pp. 104-05) .
In the same interview he distinguished between economics at Chicago and in Cambridge,
MA:
There's no doubt that Chicago was distinctive, and has been ever since.
The real distinction was not making price theory the focal point of the graduate curriculum. That isn't the real distinction at all. The fundamental distinction is treating economics as a serious subject versus treating it as a branch of mathematics, and treating it as a scientific subject as opposed to an aesthetic subject if I might put it that way. … The fundamental difference between Chicago at that time and let's say Harvard, was that at Chicago economics was a serious subject to be used in discussing real problems, and you could get some knowledge and some answers from it. For Harvard, economics was an intellectual discipline on a par with mathematics, which was fascinating to explore, but you musn't draw any conclusions from it. It wasn't going to enable you to solve any problems, and I think that's always been a fundamental difference between Chicago and other places. MIT more recently has been a better exemplar than Harvard. And of course there are no such things as one hundred per cent pure cases either at Chicago, or elsewhere (Hammond, 1992, p. 110) .
In Alfred Marshall's Cambridge college room hung a portrait of a working man.
Marshall is reported to have said that "I set it up above the chimney-piece of my room in college and thence forward called it my patron-saint, and devoted myself to trying to fit men like that for heaven." (Groenewegen, p. 130) . For Friedman the purpose of economics was not so much to fit working men for heaven as to allow them to find a bit of heaven here on earth, and on their own terms. If you put Friedman's belief that economics is a practical science together with his belief in dignity of common people you have a big piece of his ideology. Drawing from A. V. Dicey's Law and Public Opinion he argued that although the trend toward collectivist policies had not slowed, collectivist ideas were beginning to wane.
Thus it was important to make the case for a new liberalism, one that he called the "competitive order." Friedman said that it was not his wish to turn back the clock to nineteenth century laissez faire liberalism, which "failed to see that there were some functions the price system could not perform and that unless these other functions were somehow provided for, the price system could not discharge the tasks from which it is admirably fitted" (1951, p. 91) . Among these functions was to ensure that no one had undue economic power over others. Friedman's vision of the proper role of the state was Hayekian in emphasizing rule of law:
These are broad powers and important responsibilities that the neo-liberal would give to the state. But the essential point is that they are all powers that are limited in scope and capable of being exercised by general rules applying to all. They are designed to permit government by law rather than by administrative order. They leave scope for the exercise of individual initiative by millions of independent economic units (1951, p.
93).
The opening chapter of Capitalism and Freedom on "The Relationship Between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom" was written for a symposium held at Princeton in September 1956 and published under the title "Capitalism and Freedom" (in Morley, 1958 ). Here we find Friedman's two-fold argument for economic freedom, that it is itself important and that it is essential as a guarantor of political freedom.
The first publication where Friedman used neo-liberal principles to inform policy analysis was "A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability" (1948). He did not make an argument for the principles, but assumed them.
The basic long-run objectives, shared, I am sure, by most economists, are political freedom, economic efficiency, and substantial equality of economic power. … I believe -and at this stage agreement will be far less widespread -that all three objectives can best be realized by relying, as far as possible, on a market mechanism within a "competitive order" to organize the utilization of economic resources (1948 in 1953, p. 134 The day I proved that no one could be more than 60,000 standard deviations dumber than the mean, that Samuelson inequality made my day.
The fact that subsequent writers have both generalized beyond it and discovered antecedents of it in earlier writings has not altered my pleasure in it. For that is the way of science, and sufficient to the day is the increment to the house of science that day brings (1986, p. 73) .
In my adult life I have occasionally been criticized for inadequacy in statistical or econometric method. Crum is responsible; from him I early formed the impression that no figure and no calculation was really valid and that it was foolish to expose one's self by citing one (1981, p. 45) .
In his AEA presidential address, Galbraith made a critical attack on neo-Keynesian economics and neoclassical economics:
Neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economics, though providing unlimited opportunity for demanding refinement, has a decisive flaw. It offers no useful handle for grasping the economic problems that now beset the modern society (1973, p. 2).
For Galbraith the problem with both neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economics was that they removed power and politics from the picture of the economy:
In eliding power -in making economics a non-political subjectneoclassical theory, by the same process, destroys its relation with the real world. The problems of this world, moreover, are increasing both in number and in the depth of their social affliction. In consequence neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economics is relegating its players to the social sidelines where they either call no plays or urge the wrong ones
This brings us to the question of economics and politics. Recall the concern of Wesley Mitchell and the founders of the National Bureau to ensure scientific integrity by making determinations of the facts of economic, social, and industrial life in a politically impartial manner. Galbraith found economists wanting for their failure to come to terms with the reality of power and politics. "Power being so comprehensively deployed in a very large part of the total economy, there can no longer, except for reasons of gameplaying or more deliberate intellectual evasion, be any separation between economics and politics" (1973, p. 6 there was concern at the university, "not wholly illegitimate, that I might concern myself unduly with political activity … at the expense of the students, scholarly writing and decent academic reticence" (1981, p. 277).
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Writing of the traits that qualified him for the task of setting prices at the OPA, Galbraith claimed that in addition to ability to envision the whole structure of an economy and translate that vision into policy actions, to adjust his views when circumstances change, and having enduring confidence, "one had to believe that one's critics were ill-motivated, uninformed, unintelligent or instinctively wrong" (1981, p.
125).
He followed this ground rule in comments about Friedman in his memoirs. For example:
The city of Berkeley, in the days before Messrs. Jarvis and Gann and In The Good Society Galbraith identified the political alignment of the rich and powerful:
In the United States the Republican Party is avowedly on the side of the fortunate, and to the influence and wealth of the latter the Democratic Party, or many of its members, are also attracted.
In the good society voice and influence cannot be confined to one part of the population. In the Unites States the only solution is more active political participation by a coalition of the concerned and the poor. And their instrument must be the Democratic party, for this has been its past role and the source of its past success. … Those whose primary concern is to protect their income, their capital and their business interest will always vote for the party that most strongly affirms its service to their pecuniary well-being. This is and has always been the Republicans (1996, pp. 141-2 Samuelson believed that political rhetoric exaggerated the differences between the parties, but there were nonetheless important differences: "The count in November
[1968] matters much. What matters is not simply whether a man has a majority of the votes, but also how large is the opposition. In our democracy we elect a team and not just a man. For this reason, party regularity, rather than being a substitute for careful thought, may instead be its consequence ' (1973, p. 185) . In a 1969 column on "The Economics of Class" he wrote:
To a first approximation the Republican Party is the party of the affluent, and the Democratic party is the party of the underdog. … I am not now referring to the regressions of the computer but I am speaking now of the regressions of the mind, the intuitive forecasting which I do. The other day a colleague of mine … said to me, "Paul, how long do you think it will take before a computer will replace you?" ... I thought for a moment, and as the question seemed to be asked in a mean way, I replied, "Not in a million years" (Burns and Samuelson, 1967, pp. 92-93).
Galbraith was still less bound by the canon of economic science, empirical or theoretical, having rejected both. Galbraith's economics is an economics of grand visions of historical processes, in particular of the rise of the organization, which renders economic theory obsolete:
Organization, the subordination of the individual to the common purposes of a highly structured association, is a general phenomenon. For economic purposes, however, it has three relevant manifestations -in the modern corporation, the modern trade union, and the modern state. In all three of these, but especially in the corporation and the state, organizationbureaucracy -has become the decisive source of power and the controlling influence on economic behavior (Galbraith and McCracken, 1983, p. 28-29) .
Economics must no longer be about markets, but about the organization. In an effusive Newsweek article marking publication of The New Industrial State
Samuelson said of Galbraith, "He does not write for his brethren within the guild.
He is, par excellence, a non-economist's economist" (1973, p. 258 ). I am not sure if this statement was intended to be ironic, but it is.
Samuelson referred to Galbraith as "Sage of the Mixed Economy" (1973, p. 259 ). and Samuelson, 1963, p. 24) .
This is a term that
Samuelson then discussed the technical requirement for competitive optimality (no consumption externalities, constant returns to scale, perfect competition, and nondistorting lump-sum transfers), and answered an imagined challenge from someone who complained that the real world does not meet these requirements. He next turned his sights on a hypothetical "one hundred per cent libertarian," who a couple pages later is identified as Milton Friedman. Samuelson commends Capitalism and Freedom to his audience so they can see Friedman's exposition of the notion "that it is better for one who deplores racial discrimination to try to persuade people against it than to do nothing at all -but, failing to persuade, it is better to use no democratic coercion in these matters" (Stigler and Samuelson, 1963, p. 34 ). Samuelson extends this libertarian rule against coercion to a general precept against coercion. He then demolishes it by drawing the implication that it is good to persuade someone not to gas five million humans, but not good to go beyond persuasion to prevent the atrocity. Samuelson concludes his discussion of the proper role of government:
The whole matter of proper government policy involves issues of ethics, coercion, administration, incidence, and incentives that cannot begin to be resolved by semantic analysis of such terms as "freedom," "coercion," or "individualism" (Stigler and Samuelson, 1963, p. 37) .
He tells his audience that if they remember only one thing of what he has said it should be this: "There are no rules concerning the proper role of government that can be established by a priori reasoning" (Stigler and Samuelson, 1963, p. 37) . He had warned his audience early in his talk that they might find his conclusion uncomfortably nihilist, but he hoped it would be liberating. Samuelson opened his talk with a disclaimer, saying that there were aspects of the guideposts (and other informal controls) that he admired and aspects that he did not care for. Despite the misgivings, "I shall have to be the devil's advocate in an adversary procedure designed to bring out truth and balance" (Burns and Samuelson, 1967, pp. 43-44 ). Samuelson did not know the content of Burns's remarks when he prepared his. So he set out to defend the need for guideposts and other informal controls.
Arthur Burns and
Acknowledging economic arguments against the guideposts, Samuelson pointed out that despite economists' misgivings all mixed economies were struggling with the problem of creeping inflation and output gaps, and that:
we may with fine rhetoric or telling syllogism slay the presidential guideposts a dozen times; but still, in the opinion of the vast majority of economic experts, we shall be left with the vexing dilemma that free markets do not give us a stable consumers price index at the same time that the rate of unemployment stays down to a socially desirable minimum (Burns and Samuelson, 1967, p. 45 War II and the Korean War, therefore they will work in peacetime, and Friedman saying that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon and therefore the only way to stop inflation is by controlling money supply growth. He then played off these two positions, "I suppose it will be argued by many that Professors Galbraith and
Friedman are not middle-of-the-road men" (Burns and Samuelson, 1967. p.48) . His response to Galbraith was that it was absurd to think that you can just hold wages and prices down. His response to Friedman was that if the Phillips curve is "bad," i.e., the non-inflationary rate of unemployment is too high, monetary and fiscal policy cannot remedy that problem. Improving the Phillips curve is a task for guideposts. "The guideposts and related 'incomes policies' are attempts all over the world to give us the same degree of fullness of employment with less price creep than would otherwise have been the case" (Burns and Samuelson, 1967, p. 57) . Samuelson suggested that corporations and unions had considerable leeway in setting prices, so they could be persuaded to set them in the public interest.
Al Decker, the man who slapped Friedman with the pie in 1998 explained to reporters that he had done so because "he is the world's preeminent neoliberal economist, and that economic philosophy is responsible for the destruction of our environment, the deterioration of our social structure and has brought the world to the brink of an economic collapse" (J. Lite, www.sfgate.com, 1998/10/10 Today, as a consequence of the election, the American intellectual finds himself in a situation he has not known for a generation. … For twenty years, the government of the United States, while often one which the intellectual has found confused or mistaken, has nevertheless been one which has basically understood, respected and protected intellectual purposes. Now business is in power again, and with it will inevitably come the vulgarization which has been the almost invariable consequence of business supremacy (1953, p. 162) .
Concern that business interests were patrons and beneficiaries of the neoconservative movement persists today among historians of economics. Van Horn and Mirowski (2005) 3) The academic and intellectual environment of the 1950s and 1960s that was generally hostile to market forces put academic economists in a bind. As George Stigler has argued, training in economics tends to make a person politically conservative (i.e., "in economic matters a person who wishes most economic activity to be conducted by private enterprise, and who believes that abuses of private power will usually be checked, and incitements to efficiency and progress usually provided, by the forces of competition"
(1959, p. 524)).
4) Therefore incentives were in place for academic economists to trim their economic analysis to a better fit with intellectual fashion.
5) Galbraith's resolution of this conflict was not to trim, but to throw the economics out and build a new economics fully consistent with his politics. 6) Samuelson had considerable leeway to match policy judgments with political preferences, for his scholarly work in pure theory had only the most general implications for policy.
7) Friedman's economics was more intimately connected with policy issues and his notoriety was in part the product of intellectuals' fury that he would not trim his policy judgments to fit the prevailing intellectual and political fashion.
